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ABSTRACT
This paper will argue for changes in the corporate structure of transit authorities in
Ontario by contrasting their effectiveness in producing intermunicipal transit with British
Columbia’s transit authorities. It is well established that transit is correlated to many benefits:
socioeconomic opportunities, increased quality of life, boosting the local economy, and reducing
the environmental impact of transportation. However, one area of neglect within Ontario has
been the development of intermunicipal transit within Ontario outside of the Greater Toronto
Area. British Columbia proves that with a centripetal authority structure (power towards the
centre), transit organizations can be adaptive and cooperative. Ontario’s centrifugal authority
structure (power away from the centre) is less adaptive, antagonistic, and can result in some
transit authorities refusing to cooperate with others. While there are practical barriers to
development, like determining who should pay for what, it is clear that the corporate structures
from the local and provincial levels do not help negate these obstacles. The presence of these
barriers then leads to the conclusion that Ontario has an inefficient corporate structure for
overseeing the development of intermunicipal transit and should seek to reform it in some way
to encourage cooperation or to consolidate under fewer transit authorities. Ultimately, this report
will answer why the Province of Ontario and local transit authorities have been slow to develop
intermunicipal transit routes and offer suggestions to improve.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
This paper will argue for the reform of Ontario’s transit authorities to promote the
development of more intermunicipal transit routes. This argument will be proven by contrasting
Ontario’s transit system with British Columbia’s. In setting up this comparative case study, it is
essential to note that intermunicipal transit shares a lot of the same benefits that people would
experience with intramunicipal transit. These benefits include socioeconomic opportunities,
increasing quality of life, environmental, and helping boost the local economy. All of these
benefits can be applied to intermunicipal transit and should be pursued. In looking at British
Columbia’s transit system, they have set themselves up to encourage a high degree of
cooperation and have concentrated transit authority within two organizations for the entire
province. This top-down approach has allowed these subsidiaries to develop transit routes
without having to consider municipal boundaries. In contrast, Ontario’s transit system is
organized around local transit authorities, and they face a lot of barriers to developing
intermunicipal transit. Some of these barriers include geographically separated population
densities outside of the Greater Toronto Area, restrictive bylaws, and corporate structures. For
these reasons, Ontario has seen a lack of development in intermunicipal transit, which is why
the province had to step in to create microtransit routes. Microtransit is Ontario’s name for
intermunicipal transit with smaller busses. While there are some substantial barriers to
development, British Columbia also faces similar geographical issues in terms of population
centres being separated from one another outside of the Greater Vancouver Area. This paper
aims to determine why Ontario has struggled to develop intermunicipal routes and what can
change to make it easier to establish these routes in the future. In exploring the two transit
systems, British Columbia proves itself to have a more efficient transit system through its
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adaptiveness to Greyhound Bus route cancellations and its high level of cooperation throughout
the province. Ontario demonstrates that it has a less efficient transit system through its slow
response to the Greyhound Bus route cancellations, its mixed levels of cooperation, and also
includes the case of London’s Transit Commission, where they refuse to develop routes into
other municipalities. It becomes clear that the most significant barrier to developing more
intermunicipal transit is the corporate structure currently being used in Ontario (at the provincial
and local levels). Therefore, Ontario’s corporate structure is inefficient at promoting cooperation
for intermunicipal transit, and that if Ontario wants more intermunicipal routes developed
sustainably, then it needs to consider changing.
I would also like to note that while a lot of the literature uses the term intercity to describe
transit between two municipalities, I’ve chosen to utilize the word intermunicipal because it is
more inclusive of what I am trying to explain. This is because there isn’t a consistent definition of
how big a municipality needs to be before it can be classified as a city, and some of the
municipalities connected to transit have less than 10,000 residents (which accounts for one
definition of a city).

CHAPTER TWO: BACKGROUND
This chapter’s overarching goal is to provide a framework for understanding why
intermunicipal transit is essential, the problems it faces, and the ideal way it can be developed
further in Ontario. First, it will start by providing a brief overview as to why transit infrastructure is
essential. Given that transit can help increase socioeconomic opportunities, the local economy,
and help reduce greenhouse gasses, transit has become a necessary component of modern
urban infrastructure. Second, to better understand the problems that Ontario faces, a case study
of British Columbia’s transit infrastructure will be utilized to demonstrate how they manage their
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transit system and how they can create intermunicipal transit. As British Columbia operates
using a centripetal authority model for transit, it will provide a stark contrast for how transit can
be managed. Third, this section will review Ontario’s transit infrastructure to provide a broad
overview of how transit is managed within the province. As Ontario uses a centrifugal authority
structure for managing transit, it will demonstrate some of the innate problems present when
trying to develop intermunicipal transit through municipal partnerships. Fourth, building on some
of the inherent issues discussed in the last section, this section will focus on the barriers present
in Ontario for developing intermunicipal transit. Some of these problems could include a lack of
population density, restrictive bylaws or policy, the avoidance of sprawl, and operational
funding. These issues lead to the fifth section, where there will be a justification for the research.
This section acknowledges the benefits of intermunicipal transit and the barriers preventing it in
Ontario and makes a case for why this research approach is important. Sixth, this last section
will look at the implication of this research and a theory of development for intermunicipal transit.
Ultimately, this chapter will provide a framework for understanding the importance of
intermunicipal transit, the corporate structure of transit in British Columbia and Ontario,
articulate the barriers to development, and provide a rationale for further pursuing this research.

2.1 Importance of Transit
Transit is a vital component of modern urban infrastructure, and there are many
compelling reasons why so many municipalities pursue it. First, public transit can help reduce
greenhouse gas emissions and improve air quality. Being environmentally friendly is perhaps
obvious, but it is important to reiterate and see how many passengers are required to justify
transit. Second, public transit increases the quality of life. Having access to this kind of
infrastructure can have a significant impact on the lives of those who do not drive, but also helps
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increase economic activity for the community as a whole. These first two reasons justify the
need for intramunicipal transit. However, given how this paper looks explicitly at intermunicipal
transit, the remaining reasons help justify crossing municipal boundaries. Third, as real estate
prices in cities become more expensive, more people are required to commute from further
distances to get to work, and roads are becoming more congested. Without transit to go from
where people live to where they work, the problem alienates those who do not drive and only
makes commuting worse. In larger cities, some affordable living spaces may be connected
within the same municipality. Still, it is more likely that more people will have to commute from
out of town to work, which might not be possible without transit. Which leads to reason four,
even if someone only needed to leave town for the day for a medical appointment or to visit a
loved one in the hospital, transit is the most affordable way to get there. This is especially
important if core services are not being offered in their community. Therefore, transit is an
essential component of modern infrastructure within urban centres, commuter sheds, and
regional social service delivery networks.
It is a well-known fact that public transportation is an easy way for a community to emit
fewer greenhouse gasses (GHG). Heavy-duty busses typically become more efficient than
personal motor vehicles (PMV) per person when there are more than 11 passengers on board
(Jaffe, 2012). Of course, that changes based on the type of vehicles used. Still, it does validate
the fundamental premise that public transit systems, in general, are better for the environment
provided that people use it. Other agencies have also confirmed this notion and have gone on to
say that some modern buses only need seven passengers to be more efficient than PMV’s
(DNREC, 2019). This comparison changes based on the make and model of vehicles being
compared. While this is an important consideration, the second reason shows the benefits that
transit can have on a specific community.
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The second reason why intermunicipal public transit is necessary is that it increases the
quality of life. Increasing quality of life includes the increased mobility that teenagers, seniors,
low-income, and those unable to drive experience but also gives these groups access to
potential jobs and health care services at a low price. It also includes the strong positive
correlation public transportation has with economic benefits for the broader community (Bhatta,
2003). These benefits could include rising housing prices, increased economic activity, or
employment rates. Public transportation provides a benefit not only to those who require it for
their daily commute but also helps those in the community who do not even use it. For instance,
transit helps increase the labour pool available to employers and increase the number of people
who can attend tourism events and contribute to the economic development of a municipality.
According to one Harvard University study, public transportation has been identified as the
number one way to escape poverty and climb the social mobility ladder (Bouchard, 2015).
Therefore, whether or not an individual uses transit personally, it is still a worthwhile pursuit
given the significant number of benefits it provides for the overall community.
Third, there is a trend in Canada that people are moving away from city centres and
opting to commute for work. The 2016 Census shows that people will spend 26.2 minutes
commuting to work (Statistics Canada - 1, 2016). Commuting further for work makes sense for
people since property values have increased exponentially in city centres like Toronto over the
past five years, while other places like Ottawa have increased at more reasonable rates (RBC
Research, 2017). Some of the places in Ontario with higher housing costs also include cottage
areas. These recreational properties have been increasing at 7.2 percent year over year (Royal
Lepage, 2019). This lack of affordability ultimately means that more and more people become
part of the working poor as they can no longer afford to live close to their work. As a report from
Generation Squeeze argues, the average Ontario housing prices would need to drop by over
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half for 25 - 34-year-olds to afford a mortgage of 80% of the value (Kershaw, 2019, p.13). These
growing trends have effectively put large portions of the population who work lower-income jobs
in desperate need of public transportation between municipalities to access more job
opportunities. In addition to housing costs, public transit also reduces the number of cars on the
road, meaning that there is less gridlock and more space available for parks (National Express
Transit, 2018).
Finally, public transit is the most affordable way to travel. Aside from a volunteer
organization helping people get to their medical appointments, intermunicipal transit is the
cheapest way to get to the amenities that people need. Affordable intermunicipal services are
particularly important for places that do not have all the amenities that are available in a larger
city. This has become increasingly relevant since Greyhound Bus cut the majority of its routes
back in 2018 (Greyhound Bus, 2018). Service reductions limit the distance people can go
without a car, and it is a gap that could be filled through intermunicipal transit services. Even
though it might take longer, people are willing to take transit for their budget.
Transit is a positive force at work within municipalities. They provide a more
environmentally friendly alternative to personal motor vehicles, they increase economic activity,
all while helping those who face financial pressures to commute to work. Therefore,
intermunicipal transit is a worthwhile endeavour and can dramatically improve the lives of those
who live in and around urban centres.

2.2 Overview of BC Transit
British Columbia’s transit infrastructure demonstrates a stark contrast to how transit
infrastructure has been managed in Ontario. Reviewing British Columbia’s transit model will be
done in three parts. The first section will cover the governing legislation, how it interacts with
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other government entities, and how it carries out operations. Unlike Ontario, British Columbia’s
transit infrastructure is managed entirely through a shared service model, by utilizing a crown
corporation and a transit authority which controls all transit operations within the province. The
second section will review some of the benefits that BC Transit’s centralized governance model
has to offer over centrifugal transit systems. A centralized model of governance provides a lot of
benefits, including the ability to operate intermunicipally with ease, operate with efficiencies of
scale, and utilize the crown corporation’s professional experience when establishing new routes.
In the final section, there will be a review of some of the drawbacks that can occur in BC’s
transit model and how they have handled these types of issues. One specific example is how
Victoria felt like they did not have enough local authority over their transit system, and it resulted
in lobbying the province to change the regional transit commission. While there are some
drawbacks to British Columbia’s transit system, it is clear that overall it provides many benefits
and has made it a more connected place to live.
In looking at the corporate structure and governance of British Columbia’s transit
authority, it is clear that they have taken a centralized approach to managing this infrastructure.
All of the transit within the province is overseen by two governmental agencies BC Transit and
the South Coast British Columbia Transportation Authority. BC Transit is a provincial crown
corporation whose mandate is to,

“to plan, acquire, construct or cause to be constructed public passenger transportation systems
and rail transit systems that support regional growth strategies, official community plans and the
economic development of the transit service areas” (BC Transit Act, 1996, 3(1)a).
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BC Transit has existed as a crown corporation fulfilling this role of planning and providing transit
for the province since 1979 (BC Transit - 1, 2020). BC Transit was the only approval authority in
the province for public transportation systems in the province until 1998 when the South Coast
British Columbia Transportation Authority (also known as TransLink or SCBCTA) was legislated
into existence (SCBCTA Act, 1998). It is important to note that TransLink is not a crown
corporation but is a statutory authority solely operating within Metro Vancouver; however, it is
still responsible for managing and operating a regional transportation network (SCBCTA Act,
1998, 4(1)a). Both BC Transit and the South Coast British Columbia Transportation Authority
are given the power to raise funds through taxation (with the support of transit commissions),
receive provincial grants to fund operations, and develop transit plans in line with regional and
community strategic plans (SCBCTA Act, 1998, 4(1) and BC Transit Act, 1996, 8(1)). In carrying
out their operations, BC Transit operates some of the busses themselves; however, many
operational duties are assigned to regional authorities, municipalities, or is completed through
shared service agreements (BC Transit - 2, 2017). On the other hand, TransLink is responsible
for buses, the SeaBus, the West Coast Express, and the SkyTrain. Plus, they also oversee the
major bridges and highway corridors within Metro Vancouver. To manage all this infrastructure,
TransLink has created subsidiaries to help them oversee specific aspects of their network. This
includes the Coast Mountain Bus Company to oversee busses and the SeaBus, BC Rapid
Transit Co. to oversee the SkyTrain, and TransLink directly oversees the construction and
maintenance of major bridges and highway corridors (TransLink Corporate Overview, 2020). BC
Transit is essentially a province-wide shared service model and boasts about being able to
create efficiencies that one municipal transit authority simply could not do alone. Likewise,
Translink is able to provide an extensive transit network in the Greater Vancouver Area.
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There are several benefits that a centralized transit model can offer over a centrifugal
model, like operating with efficiencies of scale and not being constrained by municipal or
regional boundaries. For instance, BC Transit saves about twenty percent on the cost of fuel
and eight percent on busses because they are buying in such large quantities (BC Transit - 2,
2017). These cost savings are then passed along to the consumers in the form of cheaper
passes. As of June 2020, a monthly pass for BC Transit changes based on location, but it can
range from $55 in Campbell River to $85 in the Capital Regional District (BC Transit - 3, 2020).
A pass in similar sized cities is $86 in North Bay, ON, and $95 in London, ON (City of North Bay
- 1 and London Transit Commission - 1, 2020). Of course, fare collection is not an accurate
reflection of the total cost because it only helps recover costs but can encourage more riders to
consider using transit over personal motor vehicles. Based on 2015 numbers, the Canadian
Urban Transit Association rates BC Transit as having about fifteen percent more passengers
per hour and operates about twenty percent more efficiently than cities of similar sizes (CUTA
Factbook, 2015). In addition to these considerable cost savings, the province can become more
connected because BC Transit largely does not need to worry about municipal or regional
boundaries. BC Transit has the authority to traverse these boundaries to establish
intermunicipal transit routes to allow for greater mobility to those who would otherwise be
unable. This ability to traverse boundaries became important when Greyhound dramatically
reduced its services in 2018 (Greyhound Bus, 2018). BC Transit was able to start planning
replacement routes immediately and was able to launch BC Bus North and offer trips within a
few days after Greyhound’s last trip (Nielsen, 2018). Combining large-scale operational
efficiencies with their province-wide authority allows BC Transit to rapidly adapt to new
situations and provide a cost-effective transit service for BC residents. Finally, having a
centralized model allows the province to set up a relatively stable operating budget for regions
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or municipalities that allows costs to be somewhat predictable. As a general rule, local
governments will account for 23.6% of the budget, the province accounts for 46.4% of funding,
and operational revenues account for 25.5% of the total budget (BC Transit - 2, 2017). This
funding model is by no means fixed, but it helps provide perspective about how operations are
typically financed. Ultimately, the centralized model used by BC Transit has been extremely
effective in reducing costs for municipalities and providing guidance for future transit plans.
There are benefits to a centralized transit system; however, some communities have felt that
their concerns are not being met or addressed by these unknown professionals.
One of the major drawbacks of having a centralized authority is that local autonomy
seems to go by the wayside. People who live in a community know the problems and desires of
residents better and can arguably plan transit routes to match what the community wants. This
sort of problem came to the fore in the Capital Regional District in 2011 when the elected board
wrote an open letter to the minister responsible for transit to ask for more democratic changes
(CRD, 2011). Essentially, the Victoria Regional Transit Committee (VRTC) was responsible for
recommending transit routes, fare cost, property tax rates, and policy direction, but was all being
done without elected officials being involved (CRD, 2011). The VRTC and BC Transit were not
communicating their plans or budgets with municipalities and did not allow for input from the
CRD board when creating those plans. This situation resulted in an undemocratic system that
did not allow the CRD to properly plan city spaces for their mixed-use transportation network
and resulted in taxation without representation (CRD, 2011). The minister announced changes
to allow elected officials on the VRTC board in 2012, and ever since, the board has been
comprised of members of the CRD board along with a few non-elected appointments. While the
CRD board has representation from every municipality in the region, the VRTC does not. The
seats for the VRTC board are designated based on population, and some places have to rotate
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a seat between mayors resulting in several places still not having representation on the board
(BC Transit Act, 1996, 25(7)). For instance, the mayor of View Royal has yet to hold a seat on
the board and has been very public about not getting an increase in transit services for his
municipality (Oli, 2019). The goal of the change to the VRTC is not to ensure democratic
transparency, but to “ensure that key transportation decisions and/or investments do not
compromise the regional network with unintended consequences” (CRD, 2011, p.2). It seems
that the province only agreed to give this authority to members of the CRD board because they
have a more complex system and adequate resources to integrate their master plan with their
transit plan properly.
While there are imperfections with the system, it is clear that the benefits of cooperation
still outweigh the costs of working alone. BC Transit saves a considerable amount on costs with
the scale of efficiency and can traverse municipal or regional boundaries with ease. The
centralized governance model has allowed the province to provide transit in 130 communities
and to adapt quickly when unexpected situations arise, like the decline of Greyhound Bus. As
there are many benefits, it is only natural that some drawbacks occur, and this came in the form
of a decline in local autonomy. Ultimately, this decline to local autonomy was fought against in
the Capital Regional District, where transit and the mixed-use transportation network became a
priority for elected officials and required greater public control over this infrastructure. The
province responded accordingly by allowing members of the CRD board to sit on the Victoria
Regional Transit Commission.

2.3 Overview of Transit in Ontario
Ontario’s transit infrastructure operates in a very different way than British Columbia and
represents a model that focuses on local autonomy. Covering Ontario’s transit infrastructure will
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be done in three parts. The first part will review the corporate structure and governing legislation
for transit. This will include an overview of how the majority of the province is governed in the
Municipal Act, 2001, and how the Greater Golden Horseshoe oversees its transit infrastructure.
Second, this paper will look at the new development of microtransit routes being established in
Ontario and how they contribute to the goal of having intermunicipal transit. Finally, this section
will point out some of the problems that arise due to the centrifugal authority structure.
Ultimately this section will show how Ontario governs its transit infrastructure and why it is
problematic for future intermunicipal plans.
Ontario’s municipalities are given broad authority under the Province of Ontario to be
able to plan and operate their transit network however they see fit. The Ontario Municipal Act,
2001, gives municipalities the exclusive right to create a public transportation system within their
municipal boundary (s.69(2)a). This legislation means that every municipality is responsible for
creating its network and is under no obligation to work with any other municipality. This
governance model leads to a centrifugal network of transit authorities, each trying to accomplish
their own goals without working towards a larger provincial plan. Throughout the province, 115
municipalities operate a transit system that ranges from specialized services to traditional transit
infrastructure (Ministry of Transportation, 2020). A specialized service might include
door-to-door pick-up or services for a specific group of people like handicap or seniors. A
traditional system is one where buses operate on pre-planned routes. There are only two times
a municipality is forced to work with another sub-provincial authority. The first is when a
lower-tier municipality has to coordinate with an upper-tier municipality (s.69(3)). The second is
in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA), where the Greater Toronto Transportation Authority (GTTA)
has the responsibility of creating and executing a regional transportation plan for the entire
Greater Toronto and Hamilton region (Metrolinx, 2020). The GTTA is the primary authority within
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the GTA. It exists “to provide leadership in the co-ordination, planning, financing and
development of an integrated, multi-modal transportation network” (GTTA Act, 2006, s.5(1)a).
This authority gives the GTTA broad authority to design and plan an integrated transportation
network with the GTA, including GO Transit and major highways (GTTA, 2006, s.6(1)). It is
worth noting that GO Transit is a crown corporation controlled by the GTTA and that the GTTA
is commonly referred to as ‘Metrolinx’ (Metrolinx, 2020). The GO Transit network has also been
expanding outside of the GTA and reaching more of the Greater Golden Horseshoe region with
light rail trains operating from Barrie, Niagara Falls, Oshawa, and Waterloo to central Toronto
(GO Transit, 2020). By creating a regional entity, the Greater Golden Horseshoe region enjoys a
comprehensive intermunicipal transit network while the remainder of the province has minimal
connectivity outside of their municipality.
Given the infrequency of intermunicipal transit options outside of the GTA network, the
Ontario Public Transit Association has been actively promoting more transit systems. In 2015,
there were 95 transit systems in Ontario. In 2019 that number grew to 109 (Peters, 2019).
These numbers are beginning to get boosted through microtransit routes that use smaller buses
for intermunicipal transit. The province was launching four of these routes in the Spring of 2020,
which is now being delayed due to COVID-19 (CBC News, 2020). These microtransit routes are
exactly the kind of transit systems that Ontario needs to build intermunicipal ridership.
Microtransit is essentially a smaller bus transit service with limited routes and stops designed to
help people commute from one municipality to another. There are four routes, including a
Tillsonburg-Ingersoll-Dorchester-London route, an Owen Sounds-Wiarton-Blue
Mountain-Orangeville route, a Sarnia-Strathroy-London route, and a Dorchester-London route.
Currently, the Ontario Ministry of Transportation is offering to pay for all operating costs for the
first five years (Strathroy-Caradoc, 2020). However, it is unclear as to who will be responsible
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for the route after that. As public transit is often subsidized and not paid entirely by the province,
it is unclear whether or not the province will try to download the service to the municipalities
benefiting from it once ridership has been built.
This last section will look at some of the problems that arise from having a centrifugal
authority structure in municipal transit. While the current system seems to work just fine when
municipalities only want to provide transit within their municipality, it has proven to be quite
difficult to work with other municipalities to extend services. The biggest issue comes down to
who will pay for ongoing operational costs. While there is no intention of looking at the ongoing
costs of transit infrastructure as part of this research question, it is clear that deciding who will
pay continues to be a huge hurdle preventing the creation of more intermunicipal routes. For
example, if a city extends one of their transit lines to link up with a nearby municipality, should
the newly connected municipality have to pay for fifty percent of the extension or nothing
because it benefits the first city more? It gets less complicated when municipalities are forced to
work under a regional entity like an upper-tier municipality. However, even when they cross over
into another upper or single-tier municipality, the same questions are raised. Again the
questions of ongoing costs are raised when looking at the future of microtransit. The province is
currently paying one hundred percent of the costs, but it is extremely unclear what will happen
at the end of the five years. If the government renews the funding, then it will still be paying for
all of the costs. Without creating regional authorities, how will the province be able to download
microtransit services back down to municipalities when they are not structurally set up to divide
costs? Certainly, all municipalities involved could agree to pay their fair share, but it is extremely
unclear as to what is fair. For instance, the Sarnia-Strathroy-London route was a project
undertaken by Strathroy that Sarnia also supported. The London Transit Commission also
supported the project by helping plan the route and getting provincial approval. However, the
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London Transit Commission made it clear that they wanted no part in it if they would have to
pay for the ongoing operational costs. This is partly because the microtransit route would not
help the residents of London nearly as much as it would help the people in Strathroy and
Sarnia. The province could certainly force the London Transit Commission to pay for part of the
costs, but this would not be popular in London. Short of forcing every municipality to pay for part
of the cost of intermunicipal transit, it is unlikely the government will be able to download costs
to municipalities without forcing it to happen through legislation. Here is an opportunity for the
government to critically look at how it structures transit operations to see if the centrifugal
structure is the best option for promoting collaboration and cooperation.
Ontario’s centrifugal network of transit authorities has seemed to work well for the
development of its current transit infrastructure. Municipalities can control how and when
services are expanded throughout their municipality, and they can make quick decisions that
adapt to the needs of the community. One downside of this established system is how it
prevents municipalities from working together to create intermunicipal transit routes. Trying to
figure out who should pay for new routes seems to be one of the biggest barriers to new route
creation.

2.4 Barriers to Development
While the corporate structure of public transportation authority is certainly one of the
biggest barriers to intermunicipal transit development, it is certainly not the only problem
present. In Ontario, there are many systemic barriers in place preventing the further
development of intermunicipal transit. Problems stem from the fact that some municipalities
refuse to operate outside their municipal boundary and have put bylaws in place to prevent it.
While laws can change, it certainly sets the tone for how they feel about intermunicipal
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collaboration. Additionally, there is a lack of population density present in the province to be
able to justify most forms of public transportation according to the Ontario Transit Supportive
Guidelines. This means that outside of the Greater Golden Horseshoe, light rail transit is not
feasible, and it is difficult to find routes that would support traditional bus transit. Finally, this
section will look at how changing the funding model for transit has negatively affected the
development of plans.
Some of the largest gaps in transit in Ontario seems to stem from the lack of cooperation
between municipalities outside of the GTA to create intermunicipal transit routes. Given the
deficit of routes available, there is a strong case to ignore municipal boundaries to provide this
kind of service. Perhaps the biggest gap in Ontario’s transit is the lack of cooperation to connect
commuter sheds to urban centres outside of the GTA. This lack of cooperation is fueled by the
policy restrictions of places like London, where the London Transit Commission is prohibited
from operating outside the municipal boundary (London By-law A.-6377-206, 2016). It seems
unlikely for municipalities like London to work towards intermunicipal transit unless transit starts
operating from a regional or provincial level to offer services that are best for the entire region,
not just for one municipality. If people’s driving behaviours do not reflect municipal boundaries,
then it only seems natural to ignore these invisible boundaries, even if it means restructuring
transit to be run from a regional entity to force cooperation instead of a local commission.
Looking at examples of intermunicipal transit internationally, it is perhaps easy to point to
the European model and wish that we had a similar system in place in Ontario. The Eurail
allows travellers to venture across 33 countries and make use of their 40,000 destinations
(Eurail, 2020). It also accounts for a total population of 548,370,287 and approximately
4,988,775 km2 from all of these countries (WorldOMeter, 2020). In addition to this vast network,
individual countries supplement the rail network with a bus transit network to ensure all key
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areas of their country are connected. Ideally, Ontario would strive to have a network as vast and
efficient as Europe to experience the benefits outlined previously. However, despite any desire
Ontarians might have towards building such a system, there are many pragmatic reasons why
these efforts always seem to fall short of expectations. The most significant reason that
prevents Ontario from creating a comprehensive transit network is the low population density.
Low population density is an issue because it means fewer people can pay for the upfront
infrastructure costs and use the transit system when built. In Europe, they have an average
population density of 110 people per km2. In Ontario, we have 908,699.33 km2 of land, with a
population of only 13.4 million residents creating a land density of only 14.8 people per km2
(Statistics Canada - 2, 2016). This lack of overall density within Ontario creates the largest
practical problem in creating a vast intermunicipal network. Ontario’s geography simply has a lot
of low population areas throughout the province, and it makes it nearly impossible to create a
viable transit network to connect it all. It would be completely impractical to develop a
comprehensive passenger rail network due to the costs. To remain cost-effective, a light rail
transit network would need a population density of 3,458 people per km2 around each station
(Guerra, 2012, p.6). This is unlikely to happen throughout most of Ontario. However, Toronto
does surpass this threshold with an average population density of 4,334.4 people per km2
(Statistics Canada - 2, 2016). This is why the GTA can support the Toronto Transit Commission,
which is owned by the City of Toronto (City of Toronto, 2020), as well as Go Transit, a provincial
corporation operated by Metrolinx (Metrolinx, 2020). Outside of the Golden Horseshoe, Ontario
is nowhere close to the required amount of density required to support light rail. This is why
Metrolinx can run a cost-effective light rail system throughout the GTA region and not one that
spans the entire province. The Go Transit system is a good example of a transit system in
Ontario that captures the surrounding area of commuters travelling into the city for work. The Go
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Transit system stretches from Barrie to Niagara Falls and from Waterloo to Peterborough (Go
Transit, 2020). Alternatively, other cities in Ontario, such as London or North Bay, do not extend
beyond municipal boundaries and fails to capture commuter traffic coming into their cities
(London Transit - 2, 2020 and City of North Bay - 2, 2020). Intermunicipal transit remains a huge
problem due to the lack of population density, and Ontario’s guidelines do not recommend
building transit infrastructure unless density thresholds are met.
The province often looks at density not just in terms of population when determining a
new possible route, but also the number of jobs in the desired area (Ontario Ministry of
Transportation (MTO), 2012, p.24). For instance, the province recommends a minimum of 50
residents and jobs combined per hectare to justify a basic bus transportation route (MTO, p.24).
For a dedicated rapid transit service, they recommend a job/population density of 160 per
hectare (p.24) with subway and light rail requiring more density than that. According to the
University of Toronto’s Centre for Urban and Community Studies,

“Very few [Census Tract’s] outside Toronto exceed the threshold of 80 people/ha. The most
common population density in municipalities outside Toronto is 20 to 40 people/ha, with
significant areas between 10 and 20 people/ha. Only a few recently developed suburban areas,
such as southern Markham, have more than 40 people/ha” (p.21).

Low densities mean that for most parts of the province, a rail network would be inappropriate for
a cost-effective system; however, a better bus transit network could be plausible by overcoming
some barriers. The province also asks municipalities to think of transit as a partner in city
planning and use it to encourage the infill of high-density areas before providing services to new
areas (MTO, p. 3). Following these rules means that before a municipality like London should
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develop a route outside its boundaries, it should ensure that its available land is developed first
to allow for cheaper service delivery (p. 11). The province is encouraging municipalities to avoid
urban sprawl so that utilities and services can remain cost-effective. This idea of building up
density first also contributes to the same kind of goals that transit offers because keeping things
close together is more environmentally friendly, helps people access jobs, and can provide
more services to more people. Ensuring that intermunicipal transit does not contribute to sprawl
is an issue that needs to be taken seriously. Additionally, this idea of avoiding sprawl is further
reinforced when the province says that transit networks should be self-containing and have all
required amenities and goods available through the network, so there is less of a need to drive
(p.13). This would mean that intramunicipal transit should be prioritized, and intermunicipal
transit is secondary. While the transit guidelines recommend pursuing intermunicipal transit, it
only says to “work with regional and municipal authorities to develop inter-urban transit” with no
other support or advice in the document for doing so (p.13). The growing struggle to create and
retain intermunicipal transit throughout the province reveals an opportunity for better
development.
Another ongoing issue for public transportation is the changing funding structure within
the Ontario Gas Tax. The Ontario Gas Tax has been a steadily growing source of income to
help fund the operations of public transportation systems (AMO Report, 2019, p.5). As the
Ontario Liberals were in power for 15 years, they created a very steady and reliable funding
structure, but since the 2018 election with the Progressive Conservatives taking power, funding
has been entirely restructured and reduced (AMO Report, 2019, p.5 - 6). This dramatic shift in
funding has ruined transit development plans and brought about a lot of uncertainty for future
plans. One municipality’s plans that have been interrupted is Kawartha Lakes. Kawartha Lakes
has had a long term vision of connecting its transit system with a Go Transit bus stop so that its
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residents could access the entire GTA region (Kawartha Lakes, 2018). This 2018 plan indicates
that this would have happened in 2026 (Kawartha Lakes, 2018), but now that the funding model
has changed, a new plan will need to be created, and this plan will likely get postponed. While
this problem cannot be addressed or solved within this paper’s scope, it is important to note how
difficult it is for transit authorities to create long-term plans when funding structures continue to
change.
Finally, there is also the notable decline of Ontario Northlander and Greyhound Bus
service. These two corporations provided a lot of support for intermunicipal transit. However,
they both experienced ridership decline before reducing routes. Ontario Northlander is a
provincial crown corporation that provided passenger rail services to Northern Ontario until 2012
(Horrobin, 2019). The population density of Northern Ontario could not support train
infrastructure and would have required significant subsidization. Greyhound Bus is a for-profit
intermunicipal bus service that scaled back the majority of its rural and northern routes in 2018
(Northern Ontario Business, 2018). As Greyhound Bus is a for-profit corporation, it does not
receive government funding. If an intermunicipal transit system is to succeed where these two
organizations failed, it would need to be non-profit, subsidized, and appropriate for the
population density. The idea of creating a small bus service to rural areas to begin building
ridership to switch to larger buses later would be the appropriate approach, which is what
Ontario is currently pursuing with microtransit throughout the province.
It is undeniable that there are many problems to overcome when developing
intermunicipal transit. A few of the hardships include corporations reducing their routes, policy
restrictions, a lack of density throughout the province, and the lack of consistency in the funding
model. Some things simply cannot be changed easily, like population density; however, knowing
the limits to what a cost-effective route can handle is vital so that service gaps can be found.
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While there is some hope that microtransit will help lead to a revitalization of intermunicipal
transit throughout the province, there is still no corporate structure in place that adequately
supports collaboration and cooperation between transit authorities.

2.5 Justification for Research
One of the goals of this research is to diagnose the reasons for the lack of intermunicipal public
transit being developed outside of the Greater Golden Horseshoe. Currently, to travel between
municipalities without the use of a personal motor vehicle, people could use trains (like Via
Rail), airplanes, or for-profit bus companies. These options are not ideal for everyday travel
because they are generally far more expensive than taking a personal motor vehicle. Airplanes
also are not ideal due to their increased environmental footprint. Intermunicipal bus transit will
seek to reduce carbon emissions and costs for consumers and help increase the mobility of
teenagers, seniors, low-income persons, and those unable to drive. This is a particularly timely
research question to be looking at because Ontario is just starting their microtransit routes, and
it is being paid entirely by the province. After the trial phase is over, it is unclear who will
continue paying for these services. Typically, the municipalities benefiting from transit would
contribute to the overall cost, but it is increasingly complicated to say what is fair and who
should pay for it. This complicated funding arrangement is why a case study looking at how
another Canadian province handles intermunicipal transit would help this situation. British
Columbia is a good case study because it has a corporate structure that allows them to make
changes easily, and they have proven they can set up intermunicipal routes quickly and
efficiently. Finally, while this paper could have focused on the intermunicipal routes that one
municipality could have established, it would still face several practical barriers that would likely
lead to the project failing. However, by addressing the problems with how Ontario has set up
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their transit system, some adjustments made from the provincial level could make it a lot easier
for establishing intermunicipal routes across the province. Ultimately, an extensive exploration
into this research question will identify the primary barriers holding Ontario back and offer some
suggestions for what it can do to help create more intermunicipal transit routes.

2.6 Implications and Theory
This section will explore the theory for how an intermunicipal transit service should be
developed and give a hypothesis as to why they are not currently happening. First, High-Speed
Bus Transit (HSBT) is a transit system developed by researchers out of Arizona, which looks at
the viability of public buses travelling from one urban area to another (Ranjbari et al., 2017). In
it, they call for intermunicipal transit to fill the gap in passenger transportation. In applying their
theory, we can see many similarities between it and the LINX transit system in the County of
Simcoe. The LINX transit system runs from each end of the county to connect to the Go Transit
station in Barrie. This kind of interconnectedness is precisely the kind of infrastructure that can
significantly increase the socioeconomic conditions available to those who do not drive. Finally, I
hypothesize that intermunicipal transit development is rare in Ontario because the corporate
structure of local transit authorities is not conducive for regional cooperation. Municipalities are
not forced to work together and have little incentive to do so.
The general theory for why intermunicipal transit is good is because it increases the
quality of life, reduces greenhouse gases, and helps increase economic activity within a
community. To accomplish these goals, American transit researchers developed a theory
arguing for a new method of intermunicipal transit that they call ‘high-speed bus transit’ (HSBT),
in which buses would have a dedicated lane on the freeway with high cruising speeds (Ranjbari
et al., 2017). HSBT was a research study from Arizona, so the survey results’ applicability is
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questionable, but the general idea that people would take a transit system that meets their
needs seems valid anywhere in North America. Ultimately, the research agreed that there is a
gap in transit infrastructure, that HSBT is a viable option for filling that gap, and that there is a
general openness to this new system. When applying this general model to Ontario, it should be
clear that this is not designed to be a replacement for long haul passenger bus services, but an
extension of transit services for commuter sheds. While this specific model of transit called for a
dedicated bus lane on highways, it would not be necessary or practical when used for smaller
communities. Also, it is important to note that this is a high-speed system so stops would be
limited. An intermunicipal service could have a stop every couple of kilometres, however, this
would incentivize the urban sprawl that the Ministry of Transportation tries to avoid (MTO, 2012,
p. 3, 11) and make the service so slow that people would not want to take it. Avoiding
unnecessary stops will help alleviate the concern that an intermunicipal transit service might
work against proper urban planning. In practice, it is clear that the new microtransit routes being
established by the province mostly meet the criteria as HSBT, with the only notable difference
being the size of the bus being used.
An excellent example of an intermunicipal transit system at work with limited stops in the
County of Simcoe’s LINX transit network. The County of Simcoe’s transit plan has already
created an intermunicipal transit infrastructure that connects Barrie, Collingwood,
Penetanguishene, and Wasaga Beach. When Simcoe County did a needs assessment on their
transit needs, they found that 28 percent of trips ended in different municipalities within the
county (Steer, 2015, p.25). Another 15.2 percent of trips had a destination in Barrie or Orilla
(Steer, 2015, p.25). While the demand to travel outside of the county was significantly less, it
still represented a significant number of transit users. This assessment presented an opportunity
to connect Simcoe County’s transit to the GO Transit network for the Greater Toronto Area. Now
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that the system is in place, transit users can travel as far as they want on the system for $6.00
or less (County of Simcoe - 1, 2019). Of course, there is a requirement to pay an additional fare
when switching to the GO Transit system. This combined network is a great deal for passengers
as no other method of transportation is as cheap. Even driving a personal vehicle is likely to
cost more in gas than taking this transit system.
Finally, I would also like to note that my ongoing hypothesis is that the structural
governance of transit networks is the biggest hurdle in creating intermunicipal transit systems.
This hypothesis cannot be proved directly since there are not always public notes or information
about failed talks between municipalities to establish intermunicipal transit routes. Instead, this
hypothesis can be proved through the Evidence of Absence. The evidence of absence is a
logical argument where the absence of something could point to a truth about the situation
(Thompson, 2018). For example, Arthur Doyle uses this in a Sherlock Holmes book, The Silver
Blaze.  I n the book, Sherlock notices that a dog typically barks when a stranger walks by, but the
dog did not bark the night its owner was killed. This fact leads Sherlock to infer that the killer
likely knew the victim. The absence of the dog barking is very telling (Doyle, 1892). Likewise, by
comparing two provinces with considerable resources but using different structures for
controlling transit, if one province has far less intermunicipal transit routes, then corporate
structure could be the problem. Therefore, the underlying methodology for research will involve
comparing Ontario’s transit infrastructure to British Columbia’s to see if corporate structure
might be impacting the types of transit being developed.
With the framework of the HSBT, there is a case to be made for direct intermunicipal bus
transit. This kind of investment in transit infrastructure will provide timely transportation and a
convenient way to access public resources. The County of Simcoe has already demonstrated its
willingness to make this kind of investment by connecting their transit service to Barrie.
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However, despite knowing the benefits of transit infrastructure, intermunicipal routes are rare
within the province. This paper also speculates that local transit authorities’ structure is a
significant barrier to the development of intermunicipal routes and will lay out the methodology
for proving this in the next chapter.

CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY
3.1 Research Methodology
In this section, the overarching goal is to provide a framework for the research that will
be done and how it will be analyzed. Starting with Sandra Van Thiel’s book, Research Methods
in Public Administration and Public Management, she outlines the inductive research process
for how one can go from a problem to developing a theory about it (Van Thiel, 2014, p.25). This
research process involves going through different stages, such as problem, observation,
inductive research, axiom, and theory (p.25). After understanding the general framework for
inductive research, the process for investigating the case study and the original case will be
explained. This process will include using objective questions to understand which system has
been more successful at creating intermunicipal routes. Finally, this section will conclude with
how the research will be analyzed so that it can be used to reach a conclusion.
First, Van Thiel outlines the inductive research process in her book and it starts with the
problem stage (p.25). In this paper’s case, the problem is the lack of intermunicipal transit
available in Ontario outside of the GTA. This problem is more significant for people who do not
or cannot drive and miss out on the benefits that transit could provide. Second, based on
observations, some parts of the province like the County of Simcoe are doing an excellent job of
connecting their region. However, the lack of connectivity is challenging to fix across the
province. While some potential areas could use further development, a lot of the province does
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not have enough population density to support transit. Both the problem and observations have
already been described in the last chapter. Third, using inductive research will involve using
knowing data about BC Transit and Ontario’s transit infrastructure to create a narrative about
how each of their corporate structures affects intermunicipal route creation. Creating a narrative
will rely on hard data as well as anecdotal evidence. This narrative will then lead to the fourth
stage of the research, where an axiom or theorem can be created based on the research
results. Ideally, this will lead to conclusions about what can be done in Ontario to help
encourage the creation of more intermunicipal transit routes.
In carrying out the research, the goal is to compare the differences between BC Transit
and Ontario’s transit networks to demonstrate the similarities, differences, and adaptiveness.
One approach to gain this specific information is to ask objective questions about both transit
systems to see how both could respond. For instance, how did both transit systems respond
when Greyhound Bus cancelled the majority of their routes? Their responses will help
demonstrate the adaptiveness of the two organizations. Additionally, this research will use
anecdotal evidence to conclude why intermunicipal transit has not been successful in Ontario.
One example is the case of London, Ontario, and why they failed to develop a transit route to
Dorchester. This case is one of the municipalities that is receiving a microtransit route. However,
if London cared about the direction of provincial policy and made an effort to collaborate, then
this route should have been created years ago. Municipalities tend not to publish documents
about the reasons for not doing something, so it will be much more challenging to find stated
reasons from a municipality for not pursuing intermunicipal transit. That is why anecdotal
evidence will be necessary to fill in the gaps where there is a lack of municipal surveys or
interviews addressing this issue. Using these multiple data sources, a common narrative will
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emerge about the contrast between BC Transit and Ontario’s transit and why Ontario has
struggled to develop intermunicipal transit sustainably.
The research can then be analyzed to see what general truths can be revealed about
the state of intermunicipal transit in Ontario. The analysis will start with a high-level overview to
see if transit moves in the right direction in both provinces. This could include looking at levels of
cooperation in both provinces and seeing if intermunicipal routes are developed often.
Secondly, both provinces will be analyzed to determine how adaptive they were to the
cancellation of Greyhound Bus routes and the causes for any shortcomings. Thirdly, the
anecdotal evidence will be vital for understanding why the province felt it was necessary to
create micro-transit routes at the provincial level instead of working with existing transit
authorities. Finally, after working through all of the research, this will lead to some conclusions
about which types of municipalities have been the most affected by the lack of intermunicipal
transit, what the most significant barrier is to development in Ontario, and provide clues about
what Ontario can do from here to continue development. Ultimately, this research is designed to
provide pragmatic suggestions about how Ontario could solve these problems to develop more
intermunicipal transit options.

CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS
In carrying out the research and analysis section of this paper, the approaches taken by
British Columbia and Ontario will be compared to see which province is better positioned to
create intermunicipal transit routes. Additionally, this in-depth study into Ontario’s intermunicipal
transit structure aims to discern some general truths that could then be used for pragmatic
advice for Ontario lawmakers. In making these determinations, this case study will compare the
responses both provinces had to the route cancellations made by Greyhound Bus and Ontario
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Northlander. The response was almost non-existent in Ontario until micro-transit routes were
announced in 2018 while the response from BC Transit was immediate and robust. Secondly,
there will be an analysis of the cooperation levels found in both provinces to see how well
government agencies (municipalities, healthcare, province) have been able to cooperate. The
ranges of cooperation could include sharing bus stops with an intermunicipal route and a
financial partnership to accomplish a broader goal. Finally, this section will look at the London
Transit Commission and why the province had to step in to create three microtransit routes
specifically connecting London to the surrounding area. While London’s unwillingness to
collaborate has been covered in the background section, this section will explore some of the
nuances why the LTC made the decisions that they did. In the analysis section, the axioms and
the rationale for them will be explained, including the types of municipalities that have been
excluded from microtransit routes, and a conclusion from each section.

4.1 Responses to Route Cancellations
When intermunicipal transportation routes are cancelled, it can drastically limit the
mobility of those who do not drive, and it should be the responsibility of governments to fill the
gaps left in vital areas. The most notable case of intermunicipal transportation decline was in
2018 when Greyhound Bus cancelled the majority of its routes in Ontario and Western Canada
(Greyhound Bus, 2018). This decline left a substantial void in intermunicipal travel for those
looking to travel throughout the province on a budget. Additionally, Ontario Northlander
cancelled its Northern passenger train route in 2012 that went from Toronto to Cochrane
(Horrobin, 2019). In response to the decline of intermunicipal transit options, BC Transit
immediately began planning its response and launched BC Bus North, which filled the void left
in the wake of Greyhound Bus (Nielsen, 2018). The bus service launched in less than a week
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from when Greyhound stopped servicing those areas, and it now connects Fort Nelson, Prince
George, Prince Rupert, and Valemount (BC Bus North, 2020). While most of British Columbia is
connected through BC Transit or BC Bus North, there are still some parts of the province that
remain unconnected. One notable missing route is the link between Kamloops and Valemount.
This route would connect BC Bus North with the transit system in Kamloops. However, the
Transportation Minister has said that it is too far for public transit to work (Davies, 2020). Plus,
this route plus Vancouver to Kamloops and Vancouver to Kelowna is currently being served by
Ebus, a private sector bus company (Ebus, 2020). In addition to all of the transportation
networks mentioned thus far in British Columbia, BC Transit has also partnered with the Ministry
of Health to ensure people who live in a community without a regional hospital can have
equitable access to health care services. BC Transit Health Connections are primarily around
the cities of Kamloops and Kelowna to connect the smaller municipalities to the regional health
centres for appointments (BC Transit Health Connections, 2020). Finally, whenever a regional
transit commission feels the need for a new transit route in their jurisdiction, it simply asks BC
Transit to complete a feasibility study then BC Transit comes up with implementation options for
the commission. There is no negotiation process necessary between municipalities or
governmental entities; it is a streamlined process. This was exactly the case when the
Alberni-Clayoquot Regional District asked BC Transit about the potential of starting a transit
route between Tofino and Ucluelet (BC Transit - 4, 2020). BC Transit completed a feasibility
study and was presenting options to the commission while attempting to seek public opinion
before the pandemic. Ultimately, two years after Greyhound pulled out of the majority of British
Columbia, the vast majority of the province remained accessible to those without a vehicle.
Additionally, Greyhound cancelling the majority of their routes would not have even affected
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passengers because BC Transit was quick to set up an alternative transit option that would be
subsidized and cheaper than the private sector option.
Ontario also took immediate action to fill in the gaps left by the route cancellations from
Greyhound Bus. However, it took a lot longer to roll out their program. After Greyhound pulled
the majority of their bus routes from Ontario, the Ministry of Transportation launched an initiative
to pay for microtransit routes for the first five years. It required municipalities without transit to
apply and to indicate which municipalities would be connected on each route. Of course, this
approach requires the approval and support of each municipality involved. Once applications
and funding were approved, routes were going to start-up in the Spring of 2020, however, this
has since been pushed back due to COVID-19 (Strathroy-Caradoc, 2020). Additionally, Ontario
Northland (a provincial crown corporation) was also able to extend its bus transit routes in
Northern Ontario to Thunder Bay after Greyhound’s departure. This expansion took some time
to get underway, and it might have been because while Ontario Northland and BC Transit are
similar in their authority over their respective areas, BC Transit has the power of taxation (BC
Transit Act, s.16) where Ontario Northland does not, and requires government funding to
survive (ONTC, 2018, p.31). Therefore, it only makes sense that it took longer for Ontario
Northland to respond than BC Transit as BC Transit could just plan to raise revenues in the
following years to pay for any debt incurred. While Ontario’s transportation expansion took time
to be funded and finally launched in the Spring of 2020 (Coffin, 2020). It seems clear that
Ontario Northland filled most of the void left by Greyhound and that the microtransit routes being
developed are primarily an extension of current transit services. If the microtransit routes were
not created to fill the Greyhound Bus gaps, then it raises questions as to why microtransit routes
were not in place before. This is especially perplexing for the smaller routes like the Dorchester
to London route or the Strathroy to London route as Greyhound serviced neither or these
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routes. In answering this, a large part of it comes down to the levels of cooperation each
province is used to seeing and how easy it is to obtain cooperation from different governmental
entities.

4.2 The Range of Cooperation
In both British Columbia and Ontario, different governmental entities are required to work
together to provide a comprehensive intermunicipal transit network. Some of these entities
refuse to cooperate in any meaningful way with other entities, while others are closer to full
integration. As this section works through the available cases, it will be clear how the
governmental entities in British Columbia, on average, have much higher levels of cooperation
than the governmental entities in Ontario. The cooperation levels used for this section will be
non-existent, some cooperation, and a high level of cooperation. The non-existent designation is
for transit authorities that do not work with any other transit authority even if an intermunicipal
route could be possible from their municipality. Some cooperation is reserved for those
municipalities willing to assist other municipalities but are not willing to engage in any
meaningful cooperation or designate any financial assistance to reach common goals. Finally,
high levels of cooperation are reserved for the entities that go out of their way to reach common
goals. This designation could include communities committing financial resources or extending
services across municipal boundaries. As Ontario has so many municipal transit authorities,
there will be more cases with a wider range of results in Ontario, but there will only be a few
examples from Ontario in each category.
Starting with the highest levels of cooperation, it is clear that very few transit
organizations are capable of cooperating to such a high degree. BC Transit utilizes its provincial
authority over municipalities to ensure cooperation, it also works with other governmental
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entities like BC Health to provide transit services for patients. Providing these services becomes
especially important when there is only one regional hospital and no way for some patients to
get there. That is why the two organizations partnered together to create BC Health Transit
Connections. BC Transit works with regional health authorities to negotiate routes and payment
for this service (Interior Health, 2009, p.7). It would also be fair to say that BC Transit also
maintains a high level of cooperation with the regional commissions that they work with to plan
and determine transit routes for municipalities. Even if this cooperation is mandated through
provincial legislation. Additionally, Translink and GO Transit share a similar authority over their
jurisdictions. The two city centres of Toronto and Vancouver offer the most connected service
that crosses several municipal boundaries, and often municipalities are eager to work with them
to get access to GO Transit. For example, Niagara Region heard that GO Transit was looking at
extending a light rail line out to their region in 2016, so they spearheaded a project to create
intermunicipal transit within their region. They did this for two reasons, first to convince GO
Transit and the provincial government that Niagara was willing to do what it takes to help the rail
line succeed. Secondly, a robust transit system would help move passengers around their
region and creates opportunities for tourism and economic development (Welland, 2016). Giving
the Greater GTA easy access to one of Ontario’s biggest tourist destinations was very exciting
and beneficial to the Niagara Region. However, the fact that Niagara Region was able to turn
this opportunity into one that helps connect the whole area to the GO Transit stop shows how
willing they are to cooperate. Additionally, Durham Region Transit is also a good example
because they have a regional transit system that connects multiple lower-tier municipalities to
GO Transit stops (DRT - 1, 2020). To make things easier for riders, they recently switched to
using the same payment system as GO Transit, the Presto payment card (DRT - 2, 2020).
Ultimately, it seems that the organizations with provincial authority seem to be best positioned to
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be able to foster high levels of cooperation, however, smaller authorities can still do a lot to help
foster cooperation.
In looking at the systems with some degree of cooperation, we are likely to find a wide
range of integration and the largest number of transit systems. Almost every municipality
connected to a regional transit system could be said to have some degree of cooperation simply
because they allowed that service to come into their municipality (unless they actively protested
it). Additionally, the same logic applies to any lower tier that allows transit that is operated by an
upper-tier government. However, this section will specifically talk about some unique cases in
Ontario that warrant a closer look. For instance, Barrie Transit might be a good candidate for a
transit system with high levels of cooperation. They have GO Transit stops, their own transit
system, and they allow Simcoe County to use their transit stops too. However, they do not pay
any money to help Simcoe County, and they do not seem to have any desire to connect with
Innisfil either. This situation again raises questions about who should pay for transit services.
Should the larger urban centre help subsidize a transit route to connect to smaller cities? It
seems like large urban centres should bear at least some responsibility as they are the ones
gaining economic activity from it. However, perhaps the bulk of the responsibility should remain
on smaller municipalities because it is their residents that are gaining the benefit of transit.
Other examples of cooperation include intermunicipal transit services between lower-tier
municipalities with the same upper-tier government or crossing into one separate municipality.
This type of cooperation would include Simcoe County, which connects several lower-tier
municipalities with Barrie and its transit network (County of Simcoe - 2, 2020). Durham region
has also taken the same approach (DRT - 1, 2020) along with Windsor’s transit being extended
into Essex County. In the case of Windsor-Leamington, Windsor is essentially acting as a
service delivery contractor for Leamington, and in return, Leamington is contributing financially
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for the operation of these specific transit routes (Pinto, 2019). Finally, the lowest end of this
cooperation category is the microtransit routes that the province has started up. Between British
Columbia and Ontario, there is an apparent trend that the cost of transit services is shared
between the province and the local municipality. The two exceptions that have been
encountered include, first, the case of BC Transit sharing the cost of BC Health Connections
with regional health authorities instead of municipalities. The second case is GO Transit since it
does not have the power of taxation like Translink, but relies on provincial contributions. These
are two notable exceptions due to the important role they play in each province, however, it
remains to be seen if microtransit will play as important of a role in the future. In theory,
microtransit should also be a shared cost service that municipalities contribute to, however,
there has been no easy way to convince municipalities to get on board with this idea without
forcing them. Plus, even if the province were able to convince some municipalities to contribute,
there would likely be other municipalities on the same route that would refuse to contribute.
Hence, the province has opted not to supersede local autonomy and pay for it themselves. The
cooperation level is so low in the case of microtransit because the province simply asked
municipalities to apply if they wanted microtransit services, and then the province gave them the
money to make it happen. The most cooperation that took place came from the City of London,
where they helped the surrounding municipalities plan their microtransit routes because they
have experience in planning routes. However, none of these municipalities had to make a
meaningful sacrifice to make this pilot project happen.
This final section will look at the lowest level of cooperation, where no transit cooperation
has taken place at any level. Some of these municipalities do not have any transit services,
while some might only have an intramunicipal service. However, in all of these cases, there is at
least the potential for intermunicipal services to be developed. As Ontario currently utilizes an
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approach where municipalities are required to apply for funding and wait to see if they get it,
there are several reasons why money may not always end up where it should. For starters, a
municipality may not see the announcement, and they might forget about the deadline or think
they are not qualified. Additionally, the province might misunderstand the application or think
that other municipalities are better suited for the money. Finally, provincial politicians might
prefer money to be spent on their constituents to help their reelection. For all these reasons,
Ontario’s system can and has failed several municipalities in relation to their intermunicipal
transit development. As many microtransit routes were set up to help municipalities with more
than 10,000 people and were within a forty-minute drive of an urban centre, this was used as a
starting point for finding possible underserved municipalities. This threshold is further confirmed
as a limit to intermunicipal transit as Orangeville has been able to hold onto their GO Transit bus
service even while Bolton, Cambridge, and Milton have all seen a permanent reduction in
services (Halliday, 2019). Orangeville has a population just under 29,000 and is about half an
hour driving away from Brampton (Google Maps, 2020). With all that being said, the
municipalities that could sustain being connected to GO Transit through intermunicipal transit
include Bracebridge, Gravenhurst, Huntsville, Lindsay, and Woodstock. Huntsville does break
the initial requirements of being within a forty-minute drive. However, a route could be
established to connect Huntsville, Bracebridge, and Gravenhurst to the Orillia Go Bus Transit
station. This route would provide an intermunicipal transit service for the 48,000+ people living
in these three communities. Admittedly, only connecting to a GO Transit stop just means that
commuters will likely have to travel further to get to where they want to go. This means that
these routes are less likely to succeed over time. The second group is far more likely to succeed
as it identifies some municipalities within the criteria that could be connected to an urban centre
with a population of over 50,000 people. This could include connecting Amherstburg, Cobourg,
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Napanee, Port Hope, and Sturgeon Falls with their neighbouring urban centre. Connecting small
municipalities with urban centres with regular intermunicipal routes is vital if commuters are
going to rely on the service for school, regular medical appointments, or recreational activities.
One possible route for these purposes could include connecting Cobourg and Port Hope with
Oshawa. This route would provide over 35,000 people with regular access to a large urban
centre with amenities and services for them to use. Additionally, Napanee could be connected
with Kingston, Sturgeon Falls with North Bay, and Amherstburg with Windsor. Based on the
routes currently being developed for microtransit, these would all be viable routes that could be
sustained over the long term, but as none of them were awarded funding, they were unable to
collaborate to build their transportation network. This is by no means intended to be an
exhaustive list of all possible municipalities missing out on intermunicipal transit, but it does list
several examples where this ‘apply for funding’ approach has failed.
Comparing two systems with vastly different corporate structures highlights the levels of
cooperation that can be attained with a centripetal authority model. British Columbia only has
two transit authorities to judge which have both attained high levels of saturation in terms of
building intermunicipal transit networks. Alternatively, Ontario has over 100 transit authorities
that range in jurisdiction and levels of cooperation. Some of these transit authorities have done
well in Ontario by partnering with other municipalities and working towards system integration,
while others have struggled to gain any traction. The province has stepped in with microtransit
routes to connect municipalities with urban centres, but the provincial approach of making
municipalities apply for this funding has left multiple municipalities behind. These municipalities
appear to be good candidates for intermunicipal transit based on current transit systems, but
they have failed to get funding for unknown reasons. Despite any desire the province might
have to connect more of the province through intermunicipal transit. It remains a struggle.
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4.3 London Transit Commission
The London Transit Commission (LTC) was explicitly left out of the last section because they
offer a unique case in Ontario when it comes to cooperation with other municipalities. While the
LTC was willing to help smaller municipalities out when they were trying to figure out their routes
for microtransit, they are unwilling to extend transit services outside of their municipality or
spend any tax dollars to create intermunicipal transit. As mentioned earlier, London, Ontario,
has a bylaw that prevents the LTC from operating outside the municipal boundary (London
By-law A.-6377-206, 2016). Their refusal to cooperate with other municipalities is precisely why
the province had to step in and create microtransit routes around London. Dorchester is just
outside of London and is essentially a suburb of the city. It is only a nine-minute drive to
London’s border and less than 19 minutes to get to Fanshawe College (a significant destination
and connection point for transit routes). Not only would creating a route like this be beneficial for
the college, but it would also help drive economic dollars into the rest of the city. Plus, refusing
to cooperate and develop any intermunicipal transit routes just punishes those who cannot drive
themselves. This neglect leads to a ceiling on access to services based on how willing and able
their friends and family are to drive them to appointments. The fact that London has not been
connected to any other municipality for so long when there are a number of options close by
seems like a huge missed opportunity. It is kind of depressing that London was utterly unwilling
to negotiate or discuss the potentiality of developing intermunicipal transit services.
In defence of the LTC, even if they were allowed to develop transit outside their
jurisdiction, it would not be an easy task. Several questions would arise about who should pay
for what. For instance, should operating costs be split between the rural municipality with the
urban centre? The urban centre obtains an advantage in economic activity, however, social
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services might see an increase in activity (and costs) due to ease of access for the surrounding
population. If the urban centre is expected to contribute, then what will the split be based on? If
it is based on property values, then is it fair that urban residents should be paying a higher
percentage per capita because urban homes often have higher valuations? If it is based on an
equal cost per person, it could place a much more significant burden on the smaller
municipalities budget where property taxes are already higher than urban centres. None of this
is apparent for either side, and both municipalities will argue to pay a lower price, and
negotiations could quickly fail, and nothing will happen. Besides, it is not like other large
municipalities outside the GTA go out of their way to develop intermunicipal transit. When GO
Transit asks to come to a municipality, they do so without raising municipal taxes because the
province funds it. Alternatively, when smaller municipalities want to get connected to an urban
centre, the smaller municipality often pays for all of the operating costs. Barrie, Ontario,
demonstrates this example perfectly. They did not pay to have GO Transit connect them or to
have Simcoe County run their bus lines to their stations, but they allowed it, and now their
residents have increased mobility without paying for the operational costs. Ultimately, the entire
corporate structure that the province has established for creating intermunicipal transit outside
the GTA is flawed. This corporate structure will cause some areas to be utterly void of
cooperation, while other areas of the province will be able to develop sustainable routes that
provide substantial benefits to residents.

4.4 Analysis
Throughout the comparative case study between British Columbia’s transit systems and
Ontario’s, several key takeaways can be learned. First, BC Transit was far quicker to respond to
the Greyhound route cancellations. This much is clear, however, what is less clear is why
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Ontario was so much slower to respond. I propose that Ontario was slower due to their
corporate structures. Secondly, Ontario’s transit authorities have a wide range of experience in
cooperating with other municipalities. In British Columbia, cooperation is all at high levels, while
it ranges from non-existence to high levels in Ontario. Two things can be learned here - the
centrifugal authority structure disproportionately benefits larger municipalities, and the
municipalities most often excluded are those with 10,000 - 40,000 residents that are less than
forty minutes driving from an urban centre. Thirdly, with the LTC’s refusal to cooperate with
other municipalities, they make the case clear that there are many hurdles in intermunicipal
transit and that if the province wants these routes to happen organically, then corporate
structures need to change. These conclusions will be pivotal for providing policy
recommendations in the next section.
Firstly, it was noted how much quicker British Columbia was able to respond to the
cancellation of Greyhound routes than Ontario transit systems. While BC Transit was able to
launch BC Bus North in the days after the routes stopped running, it took Ontario a year and a
half to have their routes launch. It seems like the primary response from Ontario was to simply
expand the services of Ontario Northland and then to launch microtransit routes. The
microtransit routes were supposed to launch in the Spring of 2020 but were delayed due to the
global pandemic. The question that remains to be answered is to ask why Ontario was so much
slower than BC Transit in making up this deficit in intermunicipal transit. The answer is twofold.
The first reason relates to the level of control transit authorities have in each province, and the
second reason relates to jurisdictional boundaries. The level of control transit authorities have in
each province is vastly different and allows them to respond at very different paces when
unexpected situations arise. In British Columbia, BC Transit is a crown corporation that has the
power of taxation. Additionally, they are also the authority for transit operations for the entire
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province except in the Vancouver area. This authority means that when an unexpected situation
arises, they can raise taxes, create new routes, or establish a sub-entity like BC Bus North. In
contrast to the BC model, Ontario transit authorities largely fall under the authority of
municipalities, which are heavily influenced by the funding model and policies set by the
provincial government. Additionally, when a transit authority wants to add busses, they often
need to apply to the province to be awarded grants to afford the expansion. Plus, the jurisdiction
of the transit authorities might only include one municipality and would force them to cooperate
with another transit authority if they ever wanted to offer intermunicipal services. These systemic
barriers are why the province needed to step in to pay for the expansion of Ontario Northland
services and the establishment of microtransit routes. All transit authorities heavily rely on
provincial funding, and they have no other way to raise the funding necessary to expand
services. This Ontario model of transit authorities being subjected to the whims of local and
provincial politicians places many barriers in their way to developing a robust transit system.
Ideally, transit authorities in Ontario would be given the same level of control that is experienced
in BC by allowing them to simply create and sustain transit routes that make sense for the
province. It would also be ideal if their jurisdictional areas could be expanded to include more
municipalities, especially in Southwestern Ontario. Even if just the jurisdictional area of transit
authorities was increased to accommodate commuter sheds. This approach would help the LTC
and its lack of cooperation by forcing it to work with Middlesex County. This kind of
amalgamation would also help minimize municipal politicians’ influence since a regional transit
authority would not be under the purview of one municipality’s bylaws.
Secondly, the levels of cooperation are higher with British Columbia’s transit authorities
than Ontario’s and it helps contribute to systemic inequality between different sized
municipalities. Large urban centres are often the most connected because they have the
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services that people want to access, while smaller municipalities are left unconnected. When
municipalities are left on their own to negotiate with one another, large urban centres seem to
avoid helping smaller communities financially. The smaller municipalities will have to pay their
own way (with provincial assistance) because there is no political pressure within cities to
connect smaller municipalities with an urban centre. Plus, smaller municipalities gain a lot in
terms of access to services and amenities by getting connected to the urban centre. The range
in cooperation can also partially be explained by the corporate structure and the restrictive
jurisdictional areas of transit authorities. It is also worth noting that the smaller municipalities that
could have the potential to sustain intermunicipal transit but have been excluded thus far share
similar features. They include municipalities with 10,000 to 40,000 residents, and they are also
within a forty-minute drive from the nearest urban centre. This includes the municipalities of
Amherstburg, Cobourg, Napanee, Port Hope, and Sturgeon Falls. These municipalities have
been excluded from cooperation even though they have the potential to sustain microtransit
routes to their respective urban centre. It might have been the case that these municipalities
simply did not apply for the funding to receive a microtransit route. They could have been too
busy or not think that they required it, or felt like it was unsustainable and were worried about
who would pay for these services after five years. Whatever the case, it is clear that making
municipalities apply for funding is not the best way to ensure there is an equitable distribution of
provincial funds. Especially when there is uncertainty about who is going to pay for services
after the pilot project is over.
Thirdly, the London Transit Commission (LTC) presents a clear case for why the
corporate structure should change in Ontario. Extending intermunicipal transit services outside
of London is geographically difficult because London is not close enough to any other major
urban centre to justify intermunicipal transit for their own sake. Ideally, if London was closer to
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Toronto or another city that was of similar size or larger, then there might be a rationale for the
LTC to justify the expense for the sake of their own residents. However, it is harder for the LTC
to see the benefit in creating intermunicipal transit for municipalities that are smaller than
London. Additionally, negotiating with other municipalities to determine who should pay for
operating expenses has been a difficult area to navigate. While it is a little unfair to place blame
on the LTC for not establishing intermunicipal transit routes that extend into Middlesex County, it
is blameworthy not to try. By not even attempting to negotiate, the LTC has systematically
restricted or even denied services to those who need it in the surrounding areas. It is for these
reasons that many organizations, including the Ontario Human Rights Commission (OHRC),
have begun to see public transit as a human right and not just as a nice to have public service
(OHRC, 2020). While this article focuses on the requirement for equal access to transit for those
who are disabled, it would not be impossible to imagine a human right of this sort being
extended to this situation. With the LTC refusing to cooperate or negotiate in good faith to
create intermunicipal transit, they systematically deny human rights. Additionally, when
conducting a route structure and service guideline review in 2015, they even note how the
provinces’ policy objectives include the development of routes across jurisdictional boundaries
(LTC - 3, 2015, p.3 s.1.6.7.3). However, throughout the rest of the document, there is not
another mention or consideration of intermunicipal transit, and this document served as the
LTC’s five-year plan for route development (LTC - 3, 2015, p. i). Clearly, the LTC had no desire
to try and change the bylaw that is preventing them from developing intermunicipal transit
routes. Luckily, the province has stepped in to create microtransit routes for the LTC, which
would likely alleviate any responsibility they might have had to create intermunicipal routes
where it might have been sustainable. Plus, it is just bad policymaking to categorically deny this
kind of transit development as an increase in traffic could be justified based on the economic
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impact that they have on the city. Especially when they are not even driving vehicles to congest
traffic any further than one bus might do. Regardless of how much blame should be placed on
the LTC and London City Council, it is clear that the current system requires a change in order
for it to work for all transit authorities. Some options could include divorcing transit authorities
from municipalities or creating regional transit authorities to control commuter sheds into urban
centres. Options to promote intermunicipal transit could range from minor adjustments or an
entire system overhaul, depending on what the provincial government and culture of the
province would be willing to support.
In concluding this section, it is important to note how the current system does not
adequately set up Ontario for long term success in creating intermunicipal transit. Based on how
every transit system is currently set up in British Columbia and Ontario, there is a unifying theme
that it is best to split the transit operating costs between the province and municipalities. This
funding arrangement is in place for all the transit systems in British Columbia and almost all of
the transit systems in Ontario. The only exceptions are the Ontario Northlander bus service, a
long haul bus service and not transit, and GO Transit. Ideally, if Ontario continues to pay for the
successful microtransit routes long term as it does for GO Transit, then there should not be a
problem. However, with changing governments, the microtransit routes could be cancelled at a
moment’s notice or simply not renewed with a new government. If the service was shared with
municipalities, it would be more likely not to be cut as it would cost the provincial government
less, and municipalities would have more stake to protest route cancellations.
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CHAPTER FIVE: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
5.1 Policy Recommendations
It is clear that in order for more intermunicipal transit routes to be developed, the current
system should be changed to remove barriers. The changes being recommended here range
from small to substantial systemic changes, however, the ultimate goal is to encourage the
provincial government to remove barriers to allow more intermunicipal routes to be developed regardless of the approach. Recommendations include not changing anything from a corporate
level, but increasing funding to develop more intermunicipal routes. A small change could
broaden the jurisdictions of transit authorities or remove the requirement of municipalities to
apply for funding but offer money based on expert opinions. Some medium changes could
include creating a separate transit authority for intermunicipal transit or merging the service with
GO Transit to allow for a more cohesive system (payment, schedules, funding model, etc.).
Another mild change could include giving the power of taxation to transit authorities and electing
board members like school board trustees. If the government of the day was feeling particularly
bold, it could pursue a more drastic option and delegate all transit authority to one or two
provincial bodies to model BC’s approach to transit. This approach could include keeping GO
Transit and creating one other transit authority to operate or contract out all other transit
operations in the province. Transition to one or two transit authorities would require so much
systemic change that it would be unlikely to go over well with politicians, unions, or the general
public for the sole fact that it would change so much overnight. This paper is listing several
options because there are so many options available for the province to consider that it would
be silly only to propose one option as a viable solution. Again the goal is to remove barriers to
intermunicipal transit development by any means necessary, and it was not within the scope of
this paper to determine which approach would be best. It is likely that the most significant barrier
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to implementation of any of these policy suggestions would be acceptance from municipal
politicians and the public service unions. That is why it is also likely that several of these options
would be acceptable and that it would be the job of the politician to make the decision for which
direction the province should head in.

5.2 Conclusion
Throughout this paper, there has been an unequivocal call for reform in the management
of transit services in Ontario. The benefits of transit have been well documented and provide a
framework for insisting on the need for intermunicipal transit. Not only does intermunicipal transit
provide an opportunity to lower greenhouse gas emissions, but it also provides access to
socioeconomic opportunities, government services, and increases one’s quality of life. Ontario’s
model for managing intermunicipal transit does not seem bad at first blush, but when it is
compared to British Columbia, the problems quickly become apparent. British Columbia uses a
centripetal governance model where only two provincial organizations hold all the authority over
transit decisions. Holding this authority allows them to respond quickly to unexpected events like
Greyhound reducing bus services and cooperating with other government organizations with
ease. In Ontario, some of the problems that become apparent are the lack of adaptiveness to
the Greyhound route cancellations and degrees of cooperation between transit authorities.
Some transit authorities in Ontario go out of their way to cooperate and help reach provincial
goals, while others are entirely left out. Even the methods for assigning transit grants are done
in unequal terms by requiring municipalities to apply for funding and hope the province supports
their planned development. All of the problems present in Ontario stem from corporate
structures in how transit authorities do not have the power of taxation and are based around a
centrifugal model of governance where authority is dispersed away from a centralized
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government. This approach makes it extremely difficult for transit authorities to negotiate and
pursue a fair deal when developing intermunicipal transit, resulting in intermunicipal transit not
being developed at all. The most notable progress made in intermunicipal transit made recently
has been the development of microtransit routes by the province. While this initiative helped
connect several municipalities, it still excludes other municipalities who share similar features.
Microtransit routes also seem to be an early indication that the province is giving up on having
transit authorities work together and will instead develop intermunicipal transit themselves.
Currently, the entire model of governance in Ontario appears unsustainable. First, there is no
corporate structure of governance overseeing the development or operations of the microtransit
routes. Second, municipalities/homeowners do not directly pay for services resulting in an
inequality of distribution for provincial funds. Additionally, will the province start paying for the
transit routes that already exist between municipalities? Taking on these costs would be another
huge expense for the province since cost-sharing between the province and municipalities has
been a well-established norm. Finally, as municipalities grow, there is no requirement or
transition plan to allow for two transit systems to integrate well even if they do not merge.
Ultimately, this leads to the strong suggestion that Ontario should change how transit is
managed within Ontario to allow for better integration and development of intermunicipal transit
throughout the province.
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